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Estimating the Value of Foresight: Aggregate Analysis of Natural Hazard 
Mitigation Benefits and Costs 
 
Abstract 
Hazard mitigation planners claim that foresighted present actions and investments 
produce significant future benefits. However, they have difficulty in supporting their 
claims, since previously their evidence typically was derived from individual case 
studies. Constituents and decision makers are often skeptical, believing that individual 
cases are either inapplicable to their situation or non-randomly selected to support a 
particular view. Planners need objective evidence based on a large body of experience to 
support the case for mitigation. Such is the unique contribution of a recent 
congressionally-mandated study, Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves (MMC, 2005). Using 
an aggregate of project-level benefit-cost analyses (estimation of average benefit-cost 
efficiency based on a random sample from a large data set), the study found that each 
dollar spent in three federal natural hazard mitigation grant programs--the Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program, Project Impact, and the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program-
- saves society an average of $4 in future avoided losses. Complementing the aggregate 
benefit-cost analysis with community-based evaluations, the study yielded valuable 
insights on how planners can improve long-term community resilience in the face of 
extreme events. To conduct the overall study, a number of methodological innovations 
were necessary, including developing a consistent methodology based on modifications 
and extensions of HAZUS-MH loss estimation software to cover wind damage, business 
interruption from lifelines, and population displacement. Valuable lessons for mitigation 
planners and policy makers emerged: the need to consider a wide variety of losses, the 
importance of mixing qualitative with quantitative analysis, the value of averaging results 
over a large number of projects, and the need to more explicitly address social issues and 
data collection in order to reduce vulnerability and enhance resilience to cope with 




Claiming the Value of Foresight 
 Planners work in the future tense--claiming that foresighted present actions and 
investments produce significant future benefits. They argue that common sense supports 
the wisdom of acting today to provide a better tomorrow. The core concept of planning is 
that actions informed by foresight can provide more benefits and incur fewer costs than 
after-the-fact responses that involve relatively more expensive retrofit, repair or 
reconstruction.  
Foresighted action is particularly relevant in the field of natural hazard mitigation, 
where it is often stated that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”  But 
hazard mitigation planners have difficulty pinning down the differences in benefits and 
costs between prevention and cure. The difficulty springs from analytical challenges and 
future uncertainties, which have long plagued practitioners of emergency management. 
Future disaster probabilities are reckoned over many decades, and, in some cases, in 
hundreds of years. Hazard mitigation projects, such as relocating households from 
floodplains, often have high up-front price tags and require challenging behavior 
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changes. And public understanding of the benefits of, and support for, investing in 
mitigation is limited, as shown in post-Katrina experience in Gulf coast communities that 
have resisted land use and structural safety recommendations in their haste to rebuild (see 
e.g., Roig-Franzia, 2006). Appeals for foresighted action based on single case studies 
(e.g., Association of State Floodplain Managers, 2000) are questioned as either 
inapplicable to differing situations or non-randomly selected by advocates to inflate the 
value of mitigation.  
 Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) offers a rigorous, widely applied tool for assessing 
public policy and public investment proposals (see, e.g., Campbell and Brown, 2003; 
National Research Council, 2004; Moore and Thorsnes, 2007). Basically, benefit cost 
analysis is concerned with efficiency. Public investments are considered to be efficient if 
their benefits exceed their costs. Given that these investments are intended to last and 
need to be maintained for many years, they are efficient if the present discounted value of 
the estimated future stream of positive impacts (benefits from the investment) is greater 
than the present discounted value of the estimated future stream of negative impacts 
(costs of the investment). Thus, a project is deemed efficient if its benefit/cost ratio is 
greater than one.  
 Skeptics about BCA note that it attempts to measure everything in dollars, 
ignoring the qualitative aspects of public policy actions; that its focus on a single 
numerical ratio overlooks associated impacts; that quantification leads to a false sense of 
confidence in the estimates; that internal rate of return or other measures better inform 
financial decision-making, and that its focus on efficiency fails to consider the important 
equity or distributional issues involved in policy decisions (see, e.g., arguments discussed 
in Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978; Boardman et al., 2001). Thus, it fails to reckon with the 
comprehensive nature of planning, which recognizes that government actions must be 
judged both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 These are indeed valid criticisms of using traditional benefit-cost analysis as the 
sole evaluative tool for a prospective project.  However, in a random sample of a large 
number of projects, and using a consistent valuation methodology, individual under-
estimates and over-estimates tend to be off-setting, yielding useful information on the 
average efficiency of the planning activity. In addition, when the benefit-cost analysis is 
augmented by community-based studies, interpretations and implications of the economic 
numbers are enhanced by setting them within the more comprehensive context where 
planners actually operate.  The combination of aggregate BCA and community studies 
effectively incorporates the advantages of the argument by “anecdotal analogy”—
namely, its richness in scope of factors considered—but mitigates the shortcomings of 
that approach which detract from its credibility—namely,  lack of scientific objectivity 
and failure to systematically draw on a large body of existing experience.   
 Aggregate BCA has been used to evaluate other public policies.  For example, 
Austin, Anderson, Courant, and Litan (2007) used it to analyze the benefits of restoring 
the Great Lakes ecosystem. So why had it not been used to evaluate U.S. mitigation 
policy? The short answer is that it is difficult to do correctly, given a number of 
methodological challenges. 
 However, aggregate BCA was successfully employed in the study responding to 
the 1999 Congressional request that the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) sponsor an independent study to assess the future savings resulting from hazard 
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mitigation activities (U.S. Senate, 1999).1  To overcome the limitations of traditional 
project-by-project analysis, an innovative methodology based on aggregate benefit-cost 
analysis supplemented with community-wide studies was developed to respond to the 
Congressional request.2  The resulting study by the Multi-hazard Mitigation Council 
(MMC), Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: An Independent Study to Assess the Future 
Savings from Mitigation Activities, analyzed the effectiveness of more than $3.5 billion 
spent in individual grants under FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Project 
Impact, and Flood Mitigation Assistance Program to mitigate risks from floods, 
windstorms, and earthquakes between 1993 and 2003 (MMC, 2005). 
 In this article, we discuss the importance to planners and policy makers of 
assessing the aggregate benefits and costs of hazard mitigation and describe the MMC 
study and its findings. In terms of study methodology, we demonstrate that aggregate 
BCA is a valuable way to quantify mitigation impacts and that supplementary community 
studies are a valuable approach to uncover qualitative mitigation impacts, especially on 
overall community resilience. In terms of study findings, we highlight implications for 
both local planners and for federal mitigation policy 
 
Assessing Mitigation Benefits and Costs 
 Effective assessment of the benefits and costs of hazard mitigation is important to 
planners and policy makers, since nearly every U.S. community is subject to risks from 
natural hazards (FEMA 2004).3 Floods are the most prevalent natural hazard; most U.S. 
counties have experienced at least one Flood Presidential Disaster Declaration and some 
have experienced as many as twelve during the 1965 to 2000 period (FEMA, 2004).  And 
many communities are also subject to one or more of the other six major natural 
hazards—earthquakes, tsunamis, tornados, coastal storms, landslides, and wildfires. 
Mitigating the risks from these hazards involves projects that affect land use and 
environmental management, public facilities, building codes, retrofitting existing 
structures, relocating threatened households from hazard areas, and other aspects of 
comprehensive planning, development regulation, and capital programming.  
 Paying for flood, earthquake, and high wind disasters in the U.S. costs the federal 
government nearly $5 billion on average each year for disaster relief and recovery 
(FEMA, 2004a)   Most of the expenditures to cover these disaster costs come from 
special appropriations in the wake of disasters, which can be problematic for a Congress 
burdened by record budget deficits. It is important to select for funding those mitigation 
projects most likely to reduce the impacts of future disasters. 
Early U.S. disaster policy employed a reactive approach, treating disasters as acts 
of God, with the federal government as the lead response and recovery agency when a 
disaster exceeded states’ response capabilities. Over time this reactive stance has been 
changed to a proactive approach. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-390) 
now requires state and local governments to prepare and implement pre-disaster 
mitigation plans. The Act, which is implemented through the Hazard Mitigation Grant 
Program, defines natural hazard mitigation as sustained action taken before a disaster 
strikes in order to reduce future property damage, human casualties, and other disaster 
impacts. Pre-disaster mitigation plans seek to reduce hazard vulnerability and strengthen 
hazard defenses (Burby, 1998; Godschalk et al., 1999; Mileti, 1999; Waugh and Tierney, 
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2007). Such plans incorporate a slate of hazard reduction techniques (Godschalk, 2007; 
Puszkin-Chevlin, Hernandez, and Murley, 2007).  
State pre-disaster mitigation plans are evaluated and approved by FEMA and 
local pre-disaster mitigation plans are evaluated and approved by state emergency 
management agencies and FEMA. Hazard Mitigation Program grants to implement the 
plans are evaluated individually and funding is awarded on a competitive basis. However, 
until now there has been no systematic analysis of the overall natural hazard mitigation 
program. 
Conventional mitigation assessment analyses have relied on case studies of the 
outcomes of individual communities’ mitigation efforts. Not surprisingly, many case 
studies tend to focus selectively on successful efforts. The literature contains a number of 
such success stories, which describe best practices and lessons learned.4  For example, 
Berkeley, California, is described as a community that has used a combination of federal 
mitigation grants and local government funding to develop and implement a coordinated 
array of earthquake mitigation projects guided by mitigation policies adopted in their 
comprehensive plan (see Chakos, Schulz, and Tobin, 2002; and Berkeley, 2002). While 
success stories can be useful motivation devices and exemplars of best practices, they do 
not provide reliable estimates of overall mitigation program benefits and costs.  
 The literature also contains examples of failure stories. Among the recent ones are 
accounts of what went wrong during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The most costly U.S. 
natural disaster, in terms of death and injury, property damage, and community 
destruction, Katrina showed the world that despite ample warnings the Gulf Coast region 
failed to implement mitigation measures adequate to cope with a major hurricane strike 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2006; Nolon and Rodriguez, 2007; Birch and Wachter, 
2006; Hartman and Squires, 2006; Cutter, 2005; Laska and Morrow, 2007). Katrina and 
other recent disasters also vividly demonstrated that individual mitigation measures may 
be immaterial absent comprehensive mitigation planning and programs. It does little good 
to strengthen roofing requirements in building codes or to provide emergency generators 
in hospitals if the buildings and emergency equipment are likely to be destroyed by 
flooding due to levee failure. Land use, flood and fire protection, transportation, 
environment, building construction, and community and economic development all affect 
disaster resilience and catastrophe potential. 
 Despite the availability of individual case studies of success and failure, prior to 
the MMC study we lacked a broad systematic assessment of natural hazard mitigation 
benefits and costs. Thus, the nation had no evidence-based analysis of the future savings 
from hazard mitigation activities.  
 
Aggregate Benefit-Cost Methodology and Findings 
Seeking objective evidence about the benefits and costs of natural hazard 
mitigation, Congress directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to 
sponsor an independent study to assess the future savings resulting from hazard 
mitigation activities (U.S. Senate, 1999).5 The resulting study found a wide array of 
mitigation benefits, concluding that these expenditures generated savings to society at a 
rate of $4 on average for every $1 spent (Ganderton et al., 2006; Rose et al., 2007).6 Both 
the study methodology and its findings have begun to affect public policy. The 
Congressional Budget Office built on the MMC approach in its subsequent study of 
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potential cost savings from the pre-disaster mitigation program (CBO, 2007).7 The 
Administration’s 2006 Budget based a $100 million budget increase for FEMA pre-
disaster mitigation grants on them (DHS, 2006). The Oregon Legislative Assembly cited 
them in a 2007 bill directing governments in the state to develop plans for mitigating and 
recovering from catastrophic disasters (Senate Bill 1038).8  
A Congressionally-mandated policy study must stand up to hard critical analysis. 
Individual case studies have documented substantial savings from mitigation, but they 
cannot be generalized to overall federal program outcomes and they are subject to the 
charge of “cherry picking”—the practice of looking only at the most successful 
mitigation cases. To deal with these issues, the study developed an aggregate 
methodology that analyzed and aggregated a systematically sampled group of hazard 
mitigation grant drawn randomly from FEMA’s National Emergency Management 
Information System (NEMIS).9 
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) was selected to provide credible results to the 
Congressional Budget Office, the Government Accountability Office, and other fiscal 
experts (see Rose, 2004a; Ganderton, 2006; Rose et al., 2007). Every FEMA-funded 
mitigation project application must present an argument that its benefit-cost ratio is 
greater than 1.0. Given competing demands for taxpayer dollars, however, it matters 
whether the ratio is 1.1., 3.8, or 15.1.10 And, since BCA has not in the past been applied 
systematically to an aggregate set of mitigation activities, we do not know the scale of 
effectiveness of overall FEMA mitigation activities in terms of use of society’s resources.  
Two types of FEMA mitigation grants were analyzed--project grants and process 
grants. Project grants invest in physical capital (drainage enhancement, acquisition and 
relocation of at-risk structures, structural improvements, nonstructural improvements, 
lifeline improvements, and land-improvement projects).  They generate tangible physical 
change to the built or natural environment and can be quantitatively assessed. Process 
grants invest in human, social, or institutional capital (e.g., vulnerability assessments, 
community priorities, action plans, education campaigns, and the development of codes 
and regulations). They support actions that reduce risk and increase community 
resilience, but their outcomes are more difficult to quantify. 
The study finding of an average benefit-cost ratio of 4 to 1 means that each dollar 
spent on mitigation grants saves society an average of $4 in real resource costs.  As 
expected, benefit-cost ratios varied across hazards, reflecting individual hazard 
characteristics and local mitigation priorities.  Rapid onset hazards (earthquakes and 
wind) pose more risks to people; slower onset hazards (floods) primarily damage 
property. Thus, seismic mitigation grants to rehabilitate school buildings to protect school 
children reduced risks to people but did not generate large monetary savings.  But flood 
mitigation grants for buyout and relocation of houses from flood zones generated large 
monetary benefits from avoided property losses.  
Table 1 summarizes the outcomes. Note that project grants are by far the largest 
category, accounting for 95% of grant costs, and that flood mitigation grants are the 
dominant project category.  Hazard specific benefit-cost ratios range from a low of 1.4 
for earthquakes through 4.7 for wind to a high of 5.1 for floods. In all categories except 
earthquakes, project grants had higher benefit-cost ratios than process grants.11 The lower 
benefit-cost ratios for process grants may be due to less developed techniques for 
estimating process benefits, rather than actual benefits.12 
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Table 1.  Estimated FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Benefit-Cost Ratios  
(All $ figures in 2004 constant dollars) 
*Row 2 (benefit) divided by row 1 (cost) equals row 3 (benefit-cost ratio) 
n.a. = not applicable because of estimation method used 
Source: MMC, 2005. 
 
It is important to understand definitions and procedures used in the 
methodology.13 Costs were acquired from the FEMA database; benefits were estimated as 
expected losses that could be avoided by the mitigation activity, considering the various 
intensity events that could occur to the mitigated facilities in the future, and the 
probabilistic likelihood of each level of intensity. (We emphasize that these intensities are 
predictive, meaning that theoretical hazard models are used to estimate the effects of 
future floods, hurricanes, etc., not past events. Of course, the theoretical hazard models 
are developed from knowledge of past events.)  These expected savings typically accrue 
over a 50-100 year period, depending on the nature of the mitigated structure involved.  
Savings are systematically estimated using the original version and various refinements 
of HAZUS-MH, FEMA’s loss estimation software,14 and basic input data from each grant 
application.  Benefits include expected: (1) reduced direct property damage; (2) reduced 
direct business interruption loss (e.g., damaged factory shutdown); (3) reduced indirect 
business interruption (e.g., factory A is shut down so B can’t operate and it must shut 
down); (4) reduced casualty losses; (5) reduced emergency response; and (6) reduced 
non-market damage (e.g., reduced environmental damage and reduced damage to 
historical sites).15   
For each grant in the sample, benefits were compared with costs to yield a grant-
specific benefit-cost ratio. Since grants were selected with probability in proportion to 
their cost, using strata of equal cumulative cost, the expected value of the population 






* i/N where i denotes benefit-cost ratio of grant i of N in a 
group (e.g., wind) and C is total population cost in the group (e.g., the total cost of all 
project grants aimed at flood mitigation; determined from NEMIS records).16   
 The study developed a number of innovations and refinements to overcome the 
challenges of aggregate BCA for natural hazard mitigation (see MMC, 2005, chapter 4 
and appendices for details of methodology).  In addition to the use of community studies, 
innovations included use of a consistent methodology17, a solid sampling strategy, 
collection of primary data18, an appropriate aggregation measure, sensitivity analysis, 
consideration of indirect benefits19, and use of reproducible methods20.  
 Equity was not addressed head-on in the MMC study because of lack of data on 
socioeconomic, race/ethnicity, or other relevant status of the affected population.  
 Project Grants Process Grants  
 Quake Wind Flood Quake Wind Flood Total 
Total grant cost ($M)  $   867  $   280   $ 2,204   $    80   $  94   $  13   $     3,538  
Total grant benefit ($M) $1,194  $1,307  $11,172   $  198   $161   $  17   $   14,049  
Total benefit-cost ratio (BCR)* 1.4 4.7 5.1 2.5 1.7 1.3 4.0 
Standard deviation of BCR 1.3 7.0 1.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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However, several inferences can be made.  On the cost side, payment for FEMA grants 
came from tax dollars based on "progressive" principles, where the well to do pay 
relatively more than the poor.  On the benefit side, most of the grants were applied to 
public facilities or semi-public private facilities (hospital and utilities) that provide 
services to the public in an even manner.  Since the poor, racial/ethnic minorities, 
children, the aged, and the infirm are more vulnerable to hazards, reducing the threat is an 
improved benefit.  Lower income groups typically reside in areas with lower property 
values, such as flood plains (Cutter, 2005; Bankoff, Frerks, and Hilhorst, 2004), so they 
are likely to benefit disproportionately by FEMA buyouts.  At the same time, mitigation 
projects can have negative impacts on the poor by raising their property taxes and 
encouraging redevelopment that may displace them. 
 
Community Case Studies Methodology and Findings 
 The MMC study paired aggregate BCA with in-depth community case studies to 
provide a more complete picture of the benefits and costs of mitigation projects and to 
supplement quantitative findings (MMC, 2005).  The community studies explored 
community perceptions of mitigation and looked for synergistic effects of mitigation 
grants on other community mitigation efforts and overall community resilience.  
Community study methodology involved four phases: pre-interview data collection, 
formal telephone interviews, site visits and face-to-face interviews, and data and 
information processing. In each community, data was collected about all mitigation 
grants received from FEMA, other federal agencies, and state agencies, investments made 
by the community to mitigate disasters (both required local shares of government grants 
and projects fully funded by the communities).  Data was also collected about state 
mitigation laws and local ordinances as well as public-private partnerships that led to 
mitigation actions (i.e., the adoption of local building codes beyond state requirements 
and the concomitant adoption of related building practices by developers).  Unlike the 
aggregated BCA analysis, which evaluated single mitigation grants in isolation, the 
community studies were able to evaluate all community mitigation activities in total, 
identify community mitigation capacity, and, using time lines, plot the longitudinal 
development of comprehensive community mitigation programs.  Following interviews 
with community officials and the collection of relevant documents and data, benefit-cost 
ratios were computed for mitigation projects and cost effectiveness was determined for 
activities with qualitative characteristics (MMC, 2005, ch. 5. pp. 59-121).    
 The MMC study used purposive sampling techniques to select eight cities and 
counties that represented the characteristics of communities that had received grants from 
FEMA for mitigation activities.21  These eight communities were selected from a group 
of 113 (single jurisdictions identified with a legal title as a city, town, borough, village or 
county within one of the 50 states) using multiple criteria, including having received over 
$500,000 in mitigation grants and being at high risk from at least one of three major 
natural disasters (wind, flood, earthquake).  The selected communities were: Freeport, 
New York; Hayward, California; Horry County, South Carolina; Jamestown, North 
Dakota; Jefferson County, Alabama; Multnomah County, Oregon; City of Orange, 
California; and Tuscola County, Michigan. 
 A BCA was performed on all FEMA-funded activities identified in the 
community studies analysis, along with review of background information. The analysis 
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benefited from the vast amounts of background engineering and science investigations 
and analyses, not available in NEMIS and therefore not used in the aggregated BCA 
analysis, which assisted in the development of benefit-cost evaluations.  Not only did 
FEMA regional offices and local communities help in gathering such background 
information, they also provided materials for additional analyses, such as the 
identification of synergistic community activities (i.e., spin-offs and spill-over effects) 
related to activities funded by FEMA.   
One question addressed by the community studies concerned the contributions to 
resilience of FEMA mitigation grants. Mitigation impacts may be analyzed from several 
viewpoints, including the disaster performance of physical structures (e.g., levees, dams, 
buildings, and other built environment elements), deaths and injuries to occupants or 
protected populations, and direct and indirect losses due to business interruption resulting 
from physical damage. A more comprehensive approach focuses on the ability of 
mitigation actions to increase the physical, social, environmental, and economic 
resilience of communities under stress. The goal is to assist communities in withstanding 
an extreme event without suffering devastating losses and without requiring a great deal 
of outside assistance (Godschalk, 2007; Godschalk, 2003; Mileti, 1999). The impacted 
communities survive and continue to function; they might bend from disaster stresses, but 
they do not break. Instead of repeated damage and continual demands for federal disaster 
assistance, resilient communities proactively protect themselves against hazards, build 
self sufficiency, and become more sustainable. Resilience is the capacity to absorb severe 
shock and return to a desired state following a disaster. It involves technical, 
organizational, social, and economic dimensions (Tierney and Bruneau, 2007; Rose, 
2007; Buckle, 2006; SDR, 2005).22 It is fostered not only by government, but also by 
individual, organization, and business actions.  
 In each community, the study determined the impact on community resilience of 
the individual FEMA mitigation grants as well as the impact of all related mitigation 
programs.   Individual grants tended to have a positive benefit irrespective of community 
context but resilience was dependent on the type and robustness of the overall community 
mitigation programs, which varied considerably.  
 The selection process produced three types of communities: 1) two communities 
with no existing mitigation program and no previous mitigation activities prior to 
receiving their FEMA grants; 2) five communities with no existing mitigation program 
but that had completed or were involved in isolated mitigation activities; and 3) one 
community that had carried out a successful, robust mitigation program for over 20 years.    
 More effective community mitigation programs exhibited seven attributes (Mittler 
et. al., 2008): 
1) Presence of a mitigation champion,   
2) Constant support of elected officials and agency heads, 
3) Institutionalized mitigation programs, engrained in local government budgets, 
4) Earmarked funding sources to support mitigation, 
5) Community involvement and support, including use of local consultants to 
supplement city or county agency staff, 
6) Opportunistic strategies seeking grants from various private, state, and federal 
sources, 
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7) Requests from other communities for mitigation champions to train their officials 
and staff.    
 The role of FEMA hazard mitigation grants depended on the type of community.  
For communities with no or limited mitigation experience, the grants provided funds to 
either resolve a contained problem or to be a catalyst for the development of a long-term 
community program.  Experience with mitigation laid the foundation for these 
communities to expand their mitigation efforts (spin off activities) or promote economic 
development in those areas that benefited from mitigation activities (spill over effects).  
For communities with an established mitigation program, the grants either accelerated 
planned mitigation projects or permitted the community to divert funds to other pressing 
problems, thereby broadening their mitigation efforts.  These grants were seamlessly 
integrated into existing mitigation programs. 
 In all eight communities, federal hazard mitigation grants played a significant role 
in the community’s mitigation history, often leading to additional activities. These grants 
acted as catalysts, demonstrating the benefits of mitigation to community decision 
makers. Interviewees reported that FEMA grants were important in reducing community 
risks, preventing future damage, and increasing mitigation capacity. They believed that 
the benefits of mitigation projects and processes went beyond what could be measured 
quantitatively to include increased awareness, esprit de corps, and peace of mind. 
 The community case study interviews did not assess economic resilience from the 
private sector viewpoint (although the project analysis did include economic resilience). 
Typically neglected in assessing hazard losses and mitigation, economic resilience refers 
to the ability of an organization or system to retain its function and continue producing, 
as well as to increase its speed of recovery (Rose, 2004b; Rose, 2007).  Strategies include 
conservation of scarce inputs, input and import substitution, relocation of facilities, 
recapturing lost business by rescheduling production at a later date, and provision for 
repair and reconstruction of capital stock.  Resilience was accounted for in the MMC 
study primarily through the inclusion of the potential of businesses to reschedule lost 
production after recovery has begun.23     
 Economic resilience strategies can reduce both direct and indirect business 
interruption losses.  Direct business interruption, even in major disasters such as the 
Northridge earthquake, affects a limited number of firms.  A larger, but still limited, 
number of businesses are affected by the loss of utility lifeline services, though this is 
often for a relatively short period (following the Northridge earthquake, 99 percent of the 
power was restored within 36 hours).  Every business in the region, however, is likely to 
be affected more lastingly by indirect, or multiplier, effects stemming from curtailment of 
critical inputs from suppliers or cancellation of orders by customers.  Even businesses 
that are physically unscathed may be forced to shut down because of these ripple 
effects.24   
 This situation is illustrated by the high benefit-cost ratios of FEMA mitigation 
grants to protect power supplies. Grants for underground placement of electricity 
transmission lines to protect against wind damage had the highest benefit-cost ratios in 
the MMC study sample, with some exceeding 50!  This is not surprising given the 
relatively small investment (often less than a few million dollars) capable of preventing a 
power outage that shuts down a major city.  These grants explain why business 
interruption benefits are the dominant category for wind hazards.    
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 Economic resilience may be inherent--built into the ordinary workings of the 
system (e.g., ability to substitute bottled or trucked water for water utility services); or 
adaptive—dependent on coping ability or ingenuity in a disaster situation (Rose, 2004b; 
Rose, 2007).  Both forms of resilience can be enhanced prior to disasters.  For example, 
distributed electricity generation (e.g., a firm’s own co-generation facility or a smaller, 
diesel-powered back-up generator) can reduce the risks of centralized power station 
interruption.  Prior contracting with business continuity consultants (who provide help in 
duplicating the data bases in communication services off site, facilitating relocation, and 
post-disaster clean up) can enhance a business’s ability to recover. Given the 
interdependencies between businesses, a single business needs to be concerned not only 
with its own resilience but also that of its suppliers and customers.  Prior planning, 
including large-scale aspects of city design (e.g., land use and public facility systems), 
along with integrating business emergency response plans into more general multi-hazard 
community-wide mitigation plans, can promote economic resilience. 
 In summary, the community studies highlighted the importance of FEMA 
mitigation grants as catalysts for local mitigation efforts, as well as key elements of long-
term community resilience. 
 
Planning and Policy Implications—Coping with Future Disasters 
What do the findings of the MMC study imply for planning and public policy? As 
a national study averaging over a large number of local geographic areas and grants, it is 
tempting to overstate the study's significance for national policy makers and to offer 
unjustifiably definitive conclusions. Conversely, one might underestimate its significance 
for local policy makers because the robustness of its conclusions rests to some extent on 
the law of large numbers, i.e., the tendency of the sum of uncorrelated random samples to 
become highly certain as the number of samples increases. The study in fact provides 
lessons and raises challenges for both sets of policy makers, and also warns both against 
simplistic conclusions.  
Federal Mitigation Issues and Recommendations 
 Certainly the economic bottom line of the MMC aggregate BC ratios affirms that 
FEMA funds have been well spent. Indeed, with an average BCR of 4.0, the suggestion is 
that more similar funding would be appropriate or even that major funding increases 
would be warranted.  However, conclusions are not so easily drawn if we raise the policy 
bar from “well spent economically” to “optimally spent in a broad economic and social 
context.”  National policy has yet to define the latter with a clear federal mitigation 
objective.  
Policy makers need to ask further questions. Should the public goal be to achieve 
the highest average return, to protect against catastrophic economic collapse of a region, 
to protect those most in need, or some combination of these objectives? Highest average 
return implies funding projects with the highest benefit-cost ratios. Protecting against 
economic catastrophes implies funding mitigation efforts for lifelines and systems that 
protect society and local economies as a whole. For example, preventing the Katrina 
catastrophe would have required $3 to $6 billion levee improvements (USACE, 2006), 
i.e., a single effort costing approximately the same as all the FEMA-funded natural-
hazard mitigation grants between 1993 and 2003 (and notably preventing some $20 
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billion in property losses alone, approximately the same as all the 1993-2003 FEMA-
funded grants are estimated to save).  
 Should future mitigation grant programs consider individual ability to pay, rather 
than treating all economic savings equally, as in BCA? For example, should well-to-do 
people who can afford to live on the coast of Florida or in the plush wooded hills of 
California be treated the same as disadvantaged inner city residents of Louisiana or Iowa? 
Under current policy, preventing loss to a fully insured million dollar home is considered 
a benefit on a par with preventing loss to 50 uninsured or only partially insured $20,000 
homes.  Equitable mitigation policy should recognize social and economic issues. 
HAZUS-MH contains economic impact data, but more extensive private sector impacts 
and social impact data should be added. In particular, the risks faced by poor and 
disadvantaged populations, who often live in high risk areas in communities and have the 
least capacity to cope with hazards, should be calculated. Methodologies are being 
developed to refine the necessary data and to simulate the distributional impacts of 
hazards and their mitigation (Oladosu and Rose, 2008).  These tools generate 
disaggregated benefit-cost analysis results according to various socioeconomic groups in 
a manner that can facilitate public participation in the decision process (Rose, Stevens, 
and Davis, 1988). 
 Even without fully answering these difficult mitigation objective questions, the 
study supports previous calls for expansions of federal mitigation funding criteria.   The 
community case studies demonstrated the value of a comprehensive approach to hazard 
mitigation.  Present federal mitigation efforts fall short of achieving the necessary 
comprehensive framework (GAO, 2007; Waugh, 2006; Godschalk et al., 1999).  The 
mitigation grant process lacks a requirement for comprehensive strategies to build 
community resilience.25  Mitigation of natural hazards,26 as well as man-made hazards27, 
is not coordinated under one umbrella in an all hazards approach administered through a 
comprehensive emergency management organization. Such a comprehensive approach 
will require vigorous efforts to overcome the stove-piped nature of current disaster and 
homeland security preparedness efforts (Tierney, 2007). 
Local Mitigation Issues and Recommendations 
 For local planners, the 4.0 national BCR can be an effective sound-bite to draw 
people to the mitigation discussion table.28  However, they are not likely to be able to do 
a similar aggregate BC analysis (although some state level agencies will have the 
necessary capacity). Local planners in specific places at specific times are not evaluating 
a large random sample of mitigation projects; they are concerned with evaluating a few 
plausible alternatives. Nonetheless, the MMC analysis provides lessons and raises 
challenges for local planners that go beyond the sound-bite.  Direct lessons relate to the 
framework of potential losses avoided by mitigation and the importance of mixing 
qualitative with quantitative analysis. 
 In the MMC study, all major categories of losses potentially avoided by 
mitigation—disaster response costs, human injury and loss of life, property damage and 
business interruption—entered significantly in determining aggregate benefit-cost ratios, 
but varied substantially in importance for individual projects or classes of projects. The 
results highlight the importance of starting with a framework that considers potential 
losses very broadly, but simultaneously not expecting all cells of such a framework to 
emerge with significant entries in any particular application.  
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 The limitations of the MMC study and the augmentation of the aggregate BC 
analysis with community studies emphasize the importance of mixing qualitative with 
quantitative analysis. The MMC study focused on integrating current best practices 
across multiple areas, not advancing understanding in a particular area.  Reflecting the 
limitations of current science, valuing items such as avoiding mental anguish and family 
stress or preventing destruction of non-replaceable historical treasures are not covered 
well in the study. The inability to confidently quantify items such as these does not mean 
they should be ignored in plan analysis.  Similarly, the study found process grants less 
amenable to analysis by current BC techniques than project grants and this calls for 
augmenting BC analysis with qualitative observations on potential impact. 
 While the small number of community studies limits conclusions that can be 
drawn from them, they do point to the need to consider individual initiatives in a broader, 
long-run context. Lining up individual projects by individually calculated BCR and 
starting implementation from the top may not be optimal if a project or process lower on 
the list might contribute more to developing a community dynamic that raises the return 
to future mitigation endeavors. 
 From two perspectives, the MMC study raises challenges for the local planner. 
First, while the national 4.0 BCR can be an effective call for local action, there is the 
danger of its becoming an unintended benchmark. For a local project with a BCR greater 
than 4.0, the existence of such a benchmark is a plus by providing ready appeal to “being 
above national average.” The problem is if local constituents and/or funding agencies 
become skeptical of a particular mitigation project with a BCR of “only” 2.5.29 
 The lesson of the study is to return to the fundamentals that gave the 4.0 
validity—it was an average over a large number of projects, not the result of potentially 
“cherry-picked” anecdotal evidence.  Planners in particular places at particular points in 
time cannot similarly average over a large number of projects—they are usually 
contemplating a few alternatives.  Nonetheless, robustness can be introduced by 
increased sensitivity testing of the BCR analysis, asking whether the BCR greater than 
one holds over a range of reasonable variation in study parameters—i.e., by 
demonstrating that BC analysis parameters were not “cherry picked.”  
 Second, it is important to recognize that averaging across areas eliminated the 
need for certain types of sensitivity testing in the MMC study that most definitely is not 
eliminated for the local planner focused on one region.  “Benefits” in the study are very 
different in nature from “costs.”  The latter are typically current certain items—cash paid 
now for program implementation—but benefits are statistically expected avoided losses 
from natural disasters in the future. “Statistically expected” and “in the future” introduce 
questions of what statistical distribution of potential hazard intensity is embedded in the 
analysis and how to discount future loss savings to make them comparable with costs 
paid now.   
There is no definitive consensus on either issue, rendering both important 
candidates for BC parameter sensitivity analysis.  In fact, the statistical distribution of 
hazard intensity at any given location changes both as our understanding of earth science 
and meteorology advance—witness the recent development of next-generation seismic 
attenuation relationships summarized by Power et al. (2008)—and as the natural 
processes themselves change over time as a result of climate change, urbanization 
impacts on hydrology, crustal stress redistribution after earthquakes, etc.  
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The MMC study tested the sensitivity of the benefit estimates to important hazard 
uncertainties (e.g., site soil classification, terrain roughness, and flood depth), as well as 
uncertainties in values exposed to loss, vulnerability of assets, and socioeconomic 
parameters such as discount rate. Though the study did not test all uncertainties in hazard 
and other distributions, it did test the ones considered likely to most strongly affect the 
results, with the goal of estimating benefits given best-estimate, upper-bound, and lower-
bound values of each uncertain input parameter (as opposed to selecting values that 
estimate benefits as highly as possible, which was explicitly not the goal of the study). 
The robustness of the MMC study’s benefits estimates depend to some extent on the large 
variety of places in the analysis (which makes the grant benefits have low correlation) 
and from the size of the sample.30 
The planner concerned with one particular geographic region and a smaller 
number of mitigation efforts might not benefit as much from the law of large numbers, 
and the uncertainty in benefits is likely to be greater from a smaller, more concentrated 
portfolio of efforts.  In the latter case, it is critical to examine and question the statistical 
hazard intensity distribution, especially in regions potentially subject to very low 
probability, but highly devastating earthquake or wind events. Just how low the “very 
low probability” is can be the statistical tail that wags the benefit dog. 
The Bottom Line for Federal and Local Planners and Policy Makers   
 On an economic benefit-cost basis, mitigation pays, and, on that basis alone, more 
needs to be spent to ensure a safe future. By spending $3.5 billion on hazard mitigation 
between 1993 and 2003, the federal government saved society $14 billion in estimated 
losses. Simultaneously, however, we need to explicitly address more difficult issues of 
social factors in mitigation objectives and community issues in mitigation planning and to 
continually “raise the bar” at all levels of analysis in this critical endeavor. This will 
entail improving FEMA data collection and carrying out research on the effectiveness of 
both project and process mitigation in the context of reducing vulnerability and building 
the resilience necessary to cope with twenty-first century hazards. Only then will “well 
spent” money become “optimally spent” money.    
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 End Notes 
                                                
1 FEMA charged the Multihazard Mitigation Council (MMC) of the National Institute of 
Building Sciences—a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization chartered by the federal 
government in 1974 to bring together representatives of government, the professions,  
industry, labor, and consumer interests to develop findings on technical building-related 
matters--with conducting the study. MMC specified the study parameters, set up a project 
management committee, and contracted with Applied Technology Council (ATC) to 
convene a research team to perform the analysis. Godschalk and West served on the 
MMC project management committee. Mittler led the ATC community studies team. 
Rose led and Porter co-led the ATC benefit-cost analysis team. 
2 FEMA does require a rudimentary benefit-cost analysis for each proposed hazard 
mitigation project.  However, applicants typically do not carry out the specialized 
sophisticated computer simulation techniques used in the MMC study. BCA information 
listed on the FEMA applications was not used in the MMC study.  
3 Important research also has been conducted on management of natural hazards in 
Europe (e.g., Greiving, Fleischhauer, and Luckenkotter 2006; Greiving, Fleischhauer, and 
Wanczura 2006). 
4  For examples of reports on successful mitigation efforts, see North Carolina Division of 
Emergency Management Success Stories, available at 
http://www.dem.dcc.state.nc.us/Mitigation/Library/Success_Stories/Perf%20Assessment
%20NC%20Print.pdf. Accessed May 21, 2007.  See also Association of State Floodplain 
Managers, “Mitigation Success Stories in the United States,” December 2000. Available 
at: http://floods.org/Publications.  Accessed May 16, 2008. 
5 The study was directed at FEMA’s three major natural hazard mitigation grant 
programs: the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, Project Impact, and the Flood 
Mitigation Assistance Program. It did not cover other federal hazard mitigation efforts, 
such as those of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
6 This aggregate benefit-cost finding does not imply that every local mitigation program 
will achieve the same benefit-cost ratio. Local circumstances may result in either higher 
or lower benefit-cost ratios. 
7 The CBO study, completed after the MMC study, was required by the Predisaster 
Mitigation Program (PDM) Reauthorization Act of 2005 to estimate the reduction in 
Federal disaster assistance attributable to the PDM program. It built on the MMC study 
findings, though it analyzes only PDM grants awarded since 2004, uses a different 
discount rate (7 percent), discounts the value of reduced injuries and deaths, and has 
some other differences. The CBO study estimated an overall benefit-cost ratio of three to 
one (CBO, 2009, p. 2). It noted that when the MMC estimated ratios are converted to a 7 
percent discount rate, the flood and wind benefit-cost ratios are within about 15 percent 
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of each other, although it found a higher BC ratio for earthquake mitigation, speculating 
that the 25 MMC projects might have been an unrepresentative sample. 
8 The Oregon bill required state agencies to develop plans for mitigating effects of natural 
disasters and for recovery and reconstruction efforts after a natural disaster has occurred. 
9 The data base of the population of grants for the study time period (June 1993-July 
2003) was the National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) used by 
FEMA to monitor the status of hazard mitigation grants. A stratified random sample of 
grants was drawn to assure representation by hazard type (flood, earthquake, wind), 
mitigation type (project or process), and grant monetary size.  The final sample consisted 
of 136 grants out of a total population of 5,479, although for purposes of reducing 
uncertainty the grants were selected to represent a much larger fraction of the total 
mitigation expenditures. For each grant in the sample, a total cost was calculated that 
included state, local and private resources, as well as FEMA resources used to carry out 
the project.  
10
 California’s Office of Emergency Services  does give project applications with a higher 
benefit/cost ratio a higher ranking factor (State of California Multi-Hazard Mitigation 
Plan, 2007) www.oes.ca.gov. Accessed July 25, 2008. 
11
  Earthquake findings are skewed because of the preponderance of school ceiling 
projects that appeared in the sample. 
12 Standard methodologies like HAZUS do not lend themselves to the estimation of the 
benefits from process grants.  Moreover, there is only a very thin literature on their actual 
measurement, such that a standard alternative--benefits transfer (adapting the results of a 
benefit estimation for an activity in one place and time to another context)--could not be 
used.  Therefore, the research team was forced to adapt results from more general analogs 
to the process grants in the sample (e.g., using information dissemination campaigns 
aimed at risks in general, rather than those just pointed at natural hazards).  
13 See the Multihazard Mitigation Council (2005) and Rose et al. (2007) for specifics of 
the research methodology. 
14  For information on HAZUS-MH, see the FEMA web site at: 
http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus. Accessed June 8, 2007. 
15 Short-term economic stimulation from post-disaster reconstruction was not netted from 
benefits since it essentially represents a transfer in time/place expenditures (e.g., from 
individual future to current expenditures, from insurance company profits to the region, 
from general taxpayers to disaster aid recipients). Benefits, except prevented casualties, 
were discounted at a rate of 2% and all benefits and costs were expressed in constant 
2004 dollars.  Following the common tenet that a future life is not less valuable than a 
current one, casualties were not discounted. 
16 Alternative methods of sampling and scaling were considered and tested using NEMIS-
reported BCR, with the method selected based on a balance between low bias and low 
uncertainty (see MMC, 2005, Appendix N). 
17  To ensure consistency, project grants benefits were estimated using HAZUS-MH, 
which is applicable to earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods.  Since the flood version of 
HAZUS was incomplete, it was necessary to extract the flood property damage functions 
that were available and to apply them to individual projects in a “reduced form” manner.  
In a similar fashion, HAZUS equations on wind damage had to be modified for 
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estimating tornado-related property and casualty losses prevented by mitigation grants.  
Also, since HAZUS-MH lacks the ability to estimate most of the direct and indirect 
business interruption impact stemming from damage to utility systems, the study 
developed a HAZUS Extension, or "patch," using data on direct customer demand for 
utility services and input-output multipliers for indirect effects.  Another HAZUS 
Extension was developed to estimate population displacement for tornados and floods.   
18  HAZUS is often applied to national averages or generic data.  However, a major 
contribution of this study was the collection of primary data on relevant structures from 
the associated project grant application. 
19  The largest category of indirect benefits refers to business interruption of customers 
and suppliers of firms, non-profit organizations or government agencies that would 
otherwise be damaged.  These "multiplier" effects were included through the use of the 
Indirect Economic Loss Module of HAZUS-MH, as well as through the use of HAZUS 
Extensions developed for public utility related projects.  Other categories often lumped 
into "indirect benefits" include societal impacts (displacement and trauma) and 
environmental benefits, many of which were estimated in their own right, rather than 
relegated to the secondary status of indirect effects.  
20  A standard criticism of BCA is that results cannot be replicated.  MMC study data are 
available from FEMA in sanitized form (so as not to reveal any specific entity).  HAZUS-
MH reduced form and extended versions are available from the study authors.  Process 
grant estimation methodology is spelled out MMC (2005). The MMC study was 
evaluated by the Congressional Budget Office in its recent evaluation of FEMA 
mitigation grant programs (CBO, 2007), including detailed questions on its methodology, 
data, assumptions, and results.  The CBO study arrived at an overall benefit-cost ratio of 
3:1, reasonably close to the MMC study’s 4:1 BCR.   
21
  One pilot city also was studied to test the methodology, but its results were not 
included in the overall analysis. 
22
 Tierney and Bruneau (2007) describe a four part resilience framework based on 
robustness (ability to withstand disasters without significant degradation or loss of 
performance), redundancy (extent to which system elements are substitutable), 
resourcefulness (ability to diagnose and solve problems), and rapidity (capacity to restore 
functionality in a timely way). 
23 Production rescheduling is one of the most effective of all post-disaster resilience 
actions (Rose and Lim, 2002).  It was computed by invoking the production “recapture 
factor” contained in HAZUS-MH. 
24 As evidenced by Hurricane Katrina, households suffer significant losses as well.  
Property damage to housing stock, loss of income, and death and injury are included in 
loss estimates, but inconvenience or social/psychological damages are difficult to 
measure and typically not incorporated into major economic indicators. For a review of 
evaluation of impacts on the general population not stemming from the business sector, 
see Rose and Oladosu (2007).  
25  As the Mitigation Saves (2005, p. 6, Volume 1) report stated: “Mitigation is most 
effective when it is carried out on a comprehensive, community-wide, long-term basis. 
Single projects can help, but carrying out a slate of coordinated mitigation activities over 
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time is the best way to ensure that communities will by physically, socially, and 
economically resilient in coping with future hazard impacts.” 
26  Foresighted mitigation policy should look beyond past experience to consider risks 
from more severe storms, climate change, and sea level rise (IPCC, 2007). A recent study 
found that California local governments, along with those in other coastal states, are 
unprepared to cope with climate change and sea level rise (Moser and Tribia, 2007), 
although the 2007 State of California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan emphasizes 
resilience from climate change, levee failure, and tsunamis, as well as earthquake, flood, 
wildfire, and other hazards. Accessed July 25, 2008: http://www.oes.ca.gov. 
27 See FEMA 386-7, Integrating human-caused hazards into mitigation planning, 
Mitigation Planning, How-To Guide #7, September 2002. Accessed July 25, 2008: 
http://www.fema.gov/plan/mitigation/howto7.shtm. 
28   Engaging the public in hazard mitigation planning can be a challenge. See Brody, 
Godschalk, and Burby, 2003; and Godschalk, Brody, and Burby, 2003) 
29
  California has adopted a BCA of 4 as a planning standard for mitigation. Its OES 
HMGP Review Form gives an application with a BCA of 1-3 zero points, 4-6 one point, 
and 6 or higher two points. (www.oes.ca.gov. Accessed July 25, 2008.) Because BCA is 
one of many criteria, a low BCA will not kill a project but it may be important in funding 
decisions if there is insufficient money to fund all projects. 
30 A preliminary statistical test indicated that a sample of at least 25 grants was required 
in each hazard to assert with high confidence that benefits exceed cost. A statistical test 
(termed tornado-diagram analysis) performed after estimating benefits indicates that, 
using the selected sampling scheme and sample size for each hazard, the aggregate 
uncertainty in benefit for flood-related grants exceeded cost with more than 99% 
confidence; in the cases of wind and earthquake, the probabilities were 99% and 83%, 
respectively. Because not all uncertainties are reflected in the sensitivity tests, these 
figures might be considered upper-bound probabilities, but since the study tested what 
were considered to be the largest uncertainties, the degree of possible overestimation is 
probably small.   
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